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Civil Arrest?
(Another) St. Louis Case Study in Unconstitutionality
Mae C. Quinn
Eirik Cheverud
INTRODUCTION
This Article advances a simple claim in need of enforcement in
this country right now: no person may be arrested for an alleged
violation of civil, as opposed to criminal, law. Indeed, courts have
long interpreted the Fourth Amendment as prohibiting arrest except
when probable cause exists to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the defendant is the person who committed the
crime. However, in many places police take citizens into custody
without a warrant for the non-criminal conduct of allegedly breaking
civil laws.
This unfortunate phenomenon received national attention in St.
Louis, Missouri following the death of Michael Brown, an unarmed
African-American teen shot by City of Ferguson police officer
Darren Wilson during a pedestrian stop in 2014.1 The tragic incident
resulted in angry protests targeted at local government and police for
their history of problematic police practices used primarily against
poor and minority residents. But in a cruel irony, such public calls for
reform around municipal ordinance enforcement were met with
 Mae C. Quinn is the director of the MacArthur Justice Center at St. Louis. She is a
former Professor of Law and Director, Juvenile Law and Justice Clinic, Washington University
in St. Louis. She would like to thank law student Tomi Akinyemi for legal research assistance.
 Eirik Cheverud graduated magna cum laude from New York Law School in 2011. He
clerked with the Staff Attorneys’ Office for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
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1. Julie Bosman & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Grief and Protests Follow Shooting of a
Teenager, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/us/police-saymike-brown-was-killed-after-struggle-for-gun.html.
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further widespread arrests. Arrests that we believe were, and are,
wholly unlawful.2
As lawyers involved in the protest movement, we are aware of
countless individuals handcuffed by St. Louis-area police, forcibly
removed from the streets, and taken into custody for everything from
“failing to disperse” to “interfering with police officer duties” to
“unlawful assembly.”3 Many were held in jail for hours; some for
days. Many paid bail to secure their release from custody pending
trial, while others spent time in overcrowded and often filthy jail cells
until they could be seen by the judge.4 Those found guilty of their
alleged acts were generally sanctioned with fines.
These events led to further critiques and some lawsuits, including
one brought by the United States Department of Justice against the
City of Ferguson.5 Attorneys and community activists deployed a
range of arguments against police actions during this time. For
instance, some challenged police treatment of arrestees; others
alleged jail conditions failed to meet minimum standards.6 Money
2. As will be further discussed below, this Article seeks to expand upon our prior
advocacy work in St. Louis following Michael Brown’s death, including testimony before the
Ferguson Commission and litigation on behalf of those arrested during protests. See infra Part
II.
3. MO. REV. STAT. § 574.040 (LEXIS through 2016 legislation) (unlawful assembly);
MO. REV. STAT. § 574.060 (LEXIS through 2016 legislation) (failing to disperse); ST. LOUIS,
MO., MO. CODE ORD. § 701.110 (2016), https://www.municode.com/library/mo/ st._louis_
county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TITVIIPUSAMO_CH701DEPO_701.110INOFUN
(interfering with a police officer).
4. See, e.g., Amanda Terkel & Ryan Reilly, Ferguson Protestors Deal with Fallout After
Arrests, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2014, 2:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/
09/ferguson-arrests_n_5791136.html; Kimberly Kindy & Wesley Lowery, Ferguson Police
Continued Crackdown on Protesters After Federal, State Intervention, WASH. POST (Oct. 10,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ferguson-police-continued-crackdown-onprotesters-after-federal-state-interventions/2014/10/09/15df8a2a-4e40-11e4-aa5e-7153e466a02d_
story.html.
5. Laura Wagner, Justice Department Sues Ferguson After City Amends Police Reform
Deal, NPR (Feb. 10, 2016, 6:01 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/10/466
329269/justice-department-sues-ferguson-after-city-amends-police-reform-deal; Investigation
of the Ferguson Police Department, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_
report.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Stephen Deere, Suit Seeks $20 Million, Alleging Wrongful Arrests,
Prosecutions in Ferguson, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.stltoday.
com/news/local/crime-and-courts/suit-seeks-million-alleging-wrongful-arrests-prosecutions-inferguson/article_be51dc4a-0f99-5a5d-a512-7aae4cac94ec.html; Matt Pearce, Missouri Cities,
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bail practices working to keep poor people in custody were attacked,
as were mandatory fines that could not be satisfied by indigent
defendants. Yet we believe these practices suffer from an even more
fundamental problem—that police engage in forcible arrests for
allegations that amount to nothing more than civil infractions.
This Article seeks to advance this largely overlooked claim. And
it does so as activists have again taken to the streets—not just in
Ferguson, but across the country to express their grief and outrage
around further unnecessary acts of violence on the part of law
enforcement against people of color. As they publicly express their
disgust with the killing of Philando Castille in Minnesota, Korryn
Gaines in Maryland, Alton Sterling in Louisiana, and Paul O’Neil in
Illinois,7 many peaceful protestors are again being met with arrest for
alleged non-crimes relating to their peaceful assembly. And in the
weeks leading up to the second anniversary of Mike Brown’s death,
more demonstrators in the St. Louis area were arrested for protest
activities.8
In Part I.A, we explain how the act of arresting residents for
municipal ordinance violations, generally considered civil infractions
under state law, is unconstitutional. Thus, such civil arrest
practices—unlawful under the Fourth Amendment—should not only
be abandoned in Ferguson, but across the country as a matter of law.
Moreover, as a matter of policy, failure to take such action will not
only leave local governments open to yet more litigation, but
Including Ferguson, Sued over ‘Grotesque’ Jail Conditions, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015, 5:37
PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ferguson-lawsuit-20150209-story.html.
7. Priscilla Alvarez, Korryn Gains and the Conflicts Between Black Women and the
Police, ATLANTIC (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/ 08/korryngaines-baltimore/494123/; Camila Domonoske & Bill Chappell, Minnesota Gov. Calls Traffic
Stop Shooting ‘Absolutely Appalling at All Levels,’ NPR (July 7, 2016, 7:19 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/07/07/485066807/police-stop-ends-in-black-mansdeath-aftermath-is-livestreamed-online-video; Alton Sterling, Father of Five, Murdered by Police
Two Months After “Blue Lives Matter” Bill Signed, DEMOCRACY NOW (July 7, 2016),
http://www.democracynow.org/2016/7/7/alton_sterling_father_of_five_murdered; William Lee,
Autopsy: Paul O’Neal Fatally Shot by Police in Back, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 17, 2016, 8:13 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-paul-oneal-autopsy-20160817-story. html.
8. See, e.g., Rebecca Rivas, Four Arrested Disrupting Muny Show Singing ‘Freedom
Song’ on Anniversary of Mike Brown’s Death, ST. LOUIS AM. (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.stl
american.com/news/local_news/four-arrested-while-disrupting-muny-show-singing-freedomsong-on/article_834a9046-5eb0-11e6-9b9b-13c534a4eca3.html.
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continue to deplete their already limited budgets and further
exacerbate tensions in police-citizen relations in these fragile times.
In Part I.B, we explain why civil arrest should be seen as
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Although the United States Supreme Court has never
squarely addressed the issue, its search-and-seizure jurisprudence
supports a determination that custodial arrest for alleged civil
wrongdoing is simply unlawful. And while the Court’s traffic
violation cases allow a fair amount of latitude for officers on the beat
dealing with low-level matters, the Court has never countenanced
widespread custodial arrest policies to address civil liability.
As Part II describes, many police officers across the country
effectuate arrests based on activities that do not rise to the level of
criminal conduct. It focuses on Missouri to provide a striking
example of civil arrest in practice. But until recently, such custodial
encounters for low-level civil violations remained under the national
legal radar. This occurred for a range of reasons—from a lack of
lawyers for persons charged with such acts, the preference of
litigators to settle cases without trial, and arcane provisions
surrounding local legal proceedings. However, widespread arrests of
Ferguson protestors for local municipal violations since the shooting
death of Michael Brown have helped shine a light on problematic
local practices that many of us already knew too well.9
Over the decades, St. Louis County residents—particularly youth
of color—have been routinely subjected to full-blown arrests for lowlevel local ordinance violations. And despite the May 2016 settlement
agreement reached between the United States Department of Justice
and the City of Ferguson, as citizens again take to the streets to
publicly mourn shootings of more black citizens by police, they are
still being met by civil arrest.10
9. Tribune Wire Reports, Several Arrests on 4th Night of Ferguson Protests, CHI. TRIB.
(Aug. 11, 2015, 12:41 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-fergusonprotest-shooting-20150810-story.html; see also Terkel & Reilly, supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
10. Terkel & Reilly, supra note 4; Consent Decree, United States v. City of Ferguson, No.
4:16-cv-000180-CDP (E.D. Mo. 2016); see also Matt Apuzzo & John Eligon, Department of
Justice Reaches Settlement with Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.
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In Part III, we call on municipalities to use common sense and cull
their local codes to ensure they do not permit arrest in connection
with mere civil or quasi-criminal cases. State legislatures should also
create preemptive statewide standards that mandate citation for such
matters to ensure that local officers do not overstep their roles. And
police departments themselves can embrace citation requirements
through training and otherwise to rethink the problematic practice of
civil arrest. Unless and until these changes occur, local governments
may find themselves contending with endless lawsuits and
unnecessary costs as activists and their attorneys—who stand ready
to take the issue to the United States Supreme Court—fight to ensure
that peaceful protest is not met with uncivil act of civil arrest.
I. LACK OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR CIVIL ARREST
Ask almost any young child to tell you what the word “arrest”
means and they can do so. In our experience representing children
and teens this is based upon representation in television shows;
pervasiveness in popular culture; and, sadly, in many instances, based
11
upon their own experiences in the modern world. And yet the
United States Constitution’s Bill of Rights—the document seen as
12
most fundamental to the law of arrest—does not even use the word.
Instead, over time, case law interpreting the Fourth Amendment’s
requirements for lawful searches and seizures has developed the
com/2016/01/28/us/department-of-justice-reaches-agreement-with-ferguson.html?_r=0 (noting
the “agreement . . . calls for officers to stop making unwarranted arrests”).
11. Travis M. Andrews, Six-Year-Old Handcuffed and Several Other Children Under 11
Arrested in Tennessee, Sparking Outrage, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/04/20/six-year-old-handcuffed-and-severalother-children-under-age-11-arrested-in-tennessee-sparking-outrage/; More Young Children
Getting Arrested, ABC NEWS (July 31, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=126807
(“Florida Department of Juvenile Justice reported that more than 100 children aged 5 and 6
have been arrested in Florida in the past 12 months.”).
12. See Richard M. Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 393, 403 (1963) (“[D]ifficulties arise from the expression of the amendment’s
protection in terms of ‘seizure’ rather than arrest.”).
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concept and contours of what is considered “an arrest” in the United
13
14
States and when such action may be undertaken by police.
A. Under Arrest in the Supreme Court
Obviously, not every encounter with police amounts to an arrest.
As one commentator has noted, the question of whether an arrest has
15
occurred generally cannot be answered in the abstract. Instead,
context is important. It is determined based upon the totality of the
circumstances, viewed from the perspective of a “reasonable person”
16
in the defendant’s situation. Thus, while an arrest does not have any
firm, bright-line features, the longer the detention, the more
movement from the place of initial encounter, and/or the more
restrictions imposed on the suspect, the more likely the interaction
has shifted from a consensual encounter of no constitutional import,
to one that is considered a full-blown arrest for purposes of the
17
Fourth Amendment.
Over time, the United States Supreme Court’s cases have
provided some guideposts for what conduct rises to the level of a fullblown arrest and must, therefore, be justified under the Fourth
Amendment. For instance, the Court has made clear a “brief, on-thespot stop on the street” does “not fit comfortably within the
18
traditional concept of an ‘arrest.’” In contrast, however, where a
13. Richard Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of “Stop” and
“Arrest,” 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 771, 771 (1982) (“Surprisingly, the development of the law
governing seizures of people has been the stepchild of fourth amendment jurisprudence.”).
14. Id. at 776 (“Thus, to fully define the scope of fourth amendment limits on seizures of
people, the Supreme Court must not only define the circumstances under which a seizure will
be permissible, but it also must define with specificity the types of activity that constitute a
seizure.”). For a comprehensive text describing constitutional arrest doctrine through 1965 and
prior to the development of the Terry-stop doctrine for less intrusive seizures, see generally
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (Frank J.
Remington ed., 2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter LAFAVE I].
15. WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 199 (5th ed., 2009) (“The question of
when arrest occurred cannot be answered in the abstract . . . .”) [hereinafter LAFAVE II].
16. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991) (“whether a reasonable person would
feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter”); United States
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“[I]n view of all of the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave . . . .”).
17. See LAFAVE I, supra note 15, at 242–44.
18. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979).
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defendant was picked up from his neighborhood, driven to police
headquarters in a squad car, and then subjected to police questions,
19
he was considered arrested for Fourth Amendment purposes.
B. Arrest Justification Jurisprudence
But when are arrests permitted under the Fourth Amendment? The
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides for
“[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons . . . against
20
unreasonable . . . seizures . . . .” It continues that this right “shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause
21
supported by Oath or affirmation . . . .” Forming the foundation of
our law of arrest, these few sentences have in many ways confounded
academics, advocates, and law enforcement agents over the
22
decades.
One recurring question is whether the Fourth Amendment requires
warrants to effectuate seizures but allows for exceptions deemed
reasonable as a matter of law, or if it allows for all reasonable
searches and seizures, with those based upon a warrant being among
23
those deemed reasonable. Under either scenario, police action
24
rooted in probable cause is a key concept. The question then
becomes, probable cause for what?
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 212 (noting that the defendant was not told he was under arrest was irrelevant).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id.
JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES,
POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 62–63 (4th ed. 2010) (referring to the Fourth Amendment’s “text
and its mysteries”). Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 547, 551 (1999) (noting the Fourth Amendment’s “text does not indicate” how its
different clauses “fit together[]”).
23. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 22, at 62 (“Perhaps the most controversial feature
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relates to the relationship between the . . . ‘reasonableness
clause’ . . . and the . . . ‘warrant clause.’”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) (describing the debate regarding the primacy of the
warrant clause versus the reasonableness clause, and declaring the latter controls); Carol S.
Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 855 (1994)
(disagreeing with Amar and urging warrant requirement as “touchstone of constitutionally
‘reasonable searches’”).
24. See Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1044 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It
bears repeating that the ‘general rule’ is that Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ only
if based on probable cause.”); see also Leagre, supra note 12, at 406 (“[I]n the few arrest cases
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Here, too, the Fourth Amendment is silent. Thus, the United
States Supreme Court, case by case, has built our modern
understanding of what probable cause modifies in the context of the
law of arrest. Taken together, we believe, the Court’s past decisions
make clear that arrest should take place only when there is a high
probability—or probable cause—that a crime has been committed
and that the defendant is the one who committed it. That is, an officer
must possess a sufficiently firm belief that actual criminal conduct—
rather than some other law violation—has been committed by the
defendant before the officer can place the defendant under arrest.
For instance, in the context of issuing warrants, the Court has
repeatedly made clear the focus must be on whether the information
provided by police demonstrates the accused has engaged in actual
26
“criminal activity . . . .” In Spinelli v. United States, the warrant
application should have been denied as it did not sufficiently prove
“that a crime[,]” there bookmaking, “was probably being
27
committed.” Of course, the more rigid two-part test advanced in
Spinelli has given way to Gates’s more flexible “totality of the
28
circumstances” standard for warrant applications. But that has not
lessened the level of wrongdoing at the heart of the Fourth
29
Amendment. Indeed, the Gates Court also spoke in terms of a
30
sufficient showing relating to actual “criminal activity . . . .”
In the contexts of warrantless arrests, the Court has gone even
further to drive home the need for an underlying crime to support an
arrest—not some lesser or different kind of wrongdoing. For
instance, in United States v. Watson, the Court—for the first time—
to reach it, the Court has clearly held that reasonableness for an arrest without a warrant
requires the same degree of probable cause as is necessary for the issuance of a warrant.”);
DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 22, at 141 (referring to “probable cause” as the “traditional
standard” under the Fourth Amendment) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
25. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26. See, e.g., Spinelli v. Unites States, 393 U.S. 410, 416–18 (1969).
27. Id. at 416–20.
28. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983).
29. Three years ago, in Bailey v. United States, the majority decision noted: “This Court
has stated ‘the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if based
on probable cause’ to believe that the individual has committed a crime.” Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at
1037 (2013) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)).
30. Gates, 462 U.S. at 271–72.
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permitted a warrantless arrest even when there was time to obtain a
31
warrant. In doing so it made repeated reference to the fact that the
defendant was suspected of not just a crime, but one that was a
32
felony.
Indeed, it is worth noting Watson’s focus on the common law
33
differences between felony and non-felony arrests. The former was
appropriate even if the crime did not occur in the presence of the
34
officer but was based upon a report provided by someone else. As
35
to the latter, the requirements were more stringent. An arrest
without a warrant would be permitted upon probable cause for
misdemeanors only when the crime was committed in the presence of
36
the officer. Thus, while it did not expressly embrace the same “in
presence” requirement for misdemeanor arrests, Watson suggested
misdemeanor crimes—and not anything less—provided the floor for
37
lawful warrantless arrests.
Countless treatises, textbooks, and officer training materials
describe the Fourth Amendment in the same way—as relating to the
investigation of crimes as compared to other activity. For instance,
professors Erwin Chemerinksy and Laurie Levenson devote an entire
section of their Criminal Procedure casebook to the inquiry: “For
38
What Crimes May a Person be Arrested?” Wayne LaFave’s popular
hornbook further refers to probable cause to arrest for crimes,
spending a great deal of time discussing the common law distinction
39
between warrantless felony and misdemeanor arrest. This analysis,
too, underscores the fact that misdemeanor conduct is the minimum
requirement for warrantless arrests. Even police materials assume
31. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
32. Id. In that instance, the crime in question was a felony—and still it would not justify
warrantless arrest inside of a home—only in a public place. Id. at 424.
33. Id. at 421–23.
34. Id. at 418.
35. Id. at 422.
36. Id.
37. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
38. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 310 (2d ed.
2013).
39. LAFAVE II, supra note 15, at 198–203.
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that crimes are the only thing for which an officer can make an arrest
40
based on probable cause.
The Supreme Court has sometimes used different vocabulary to
frame the issue. For instance, the Court has discussed “probable
cause” that an offense—rather than a crime—has occurred. This
41
choice of words finds its genesis in early case law. But in most
instances, the Court was referencing the same kind of activity: a
violation of some component of criminal law, whether a felony or
42
misdemeanor.
C. The Court’s Minor Misdeed Matters
Over the last twenty years, the Court has turned its attention to the
special problem of police engagement with traffic violators. The
Supreme Court’s traffic cases suggest officers have a fair amount of
latitude when dealing with quick-moving roadside encounters. But
quite surprisingly, it has never squarely faced the question of whether
full-blown arrests for civil traffic violations are lawful. Nevertheless,
taken together, the Court’s traffic stop and search decisions further
support a distinction between criminal activity and civil law
violations for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Perhaps one of the Court’s most well-known, and most lamented,
traffic violation decisions involved Gail Atwater, a Texas mother
who was stopped by a local police for failing to secure her young
43
children with seatbelts. During the stop, rather than merely issue a
ticket for the violation, the officer—who had encountered Ms.
Atwater before—placed her in handcuffs, turned her children over to
a friend, and transported her to the police station where she was
44
booked. She secured her release by posting a bond, and ultimately
40. See, e.g., Devallis Rutledge, Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion, POLICE
MAG. (June 7, 2011), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2011/06/probablecause-and-reasonable-suspicion.aspx (“‘Probable cause’ means reasonably reliable information
to suspect there is a ‘fair probability’ that a person has committed a crime . . . .”).
41. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925).
42. See, e.g., Brinegar, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (focusing on whether probable cause existed
for a state law violation of transporting liquor).
43. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
44. Id. at 324.
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pled guilty to the seatbelt violation, which carried a fine of twenty45
five and fifty dollars.
Ms. Atwater later filed a civil rights suit, seeking to challenge her
arrest for a fine-only offense as a violation of her Fourth Amendment
46
rights. The Court disagreed with Ms. Atwater. Rather than looking
to the nature of the possible penalty, the Court focused on the
characterization of the alleged wrongdoing. Under Texas law, failure
to secure a child with a seatbelt did not carry a jail term, but did
47
amount to a misdemeanor. In other words, the Texas legislature
somewhat unusually saw fit to include it within crimes covered by its
48
state code. Thus, it made no difference to the Court whether it was
a violent misdemeanor, or could have been dealt with by way of a
ticket. The civil-criminal distinction was implicitly at the heart of the
Court’s analysis.
Similarly, in Virginia v. Moore, the Court upheld the arrest of
David Moore, an individual who was driving on a suspended license,
even though state law indicated such non-violent conduct was to be
49
met with a ticket rather than custodial arrest. Even in the face of
officers violating the State’s “cite and release” provisions, what
mattered to the Court for purposes of suppression was that a drivingwithout-a-license charge amounted to a misdemeanor crime under
50
Virginia’s Code. It explained that “warrantless arrests for crimes
committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under
51
the Constitution . . . .”
Interestingly, the vast majority of the Court’s traffic stop cases
stand in stark contrast to Atwater and Moore. In these matters, the
Court has spent a great deal of time comparing traffic stops to the
52
kind of brief encounter first permitted in Terry v. Ohio. By and
large, traffic stops should involve the officer engaging in a brief
45. Id. at 323.
46. Id. at 325.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
50. Id. at 167.
51. Id. at 176.
52. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (rejecting the notion that “‘stop’and
‘frisk’ . . . police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment”).
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investigation of the situation at hand and then allowing the individual
53
to go on their way with a ticket —unless there is some independent
54
basis to believe the defendant has committed a crime. Thus, an
assumption in most Supreme Court traffic cases is that the underlying
violations are mere civil infractions, and not crimes in and of
themselves. Arrest for such conduct would therefore be inappropriate
under the Fourth Amendment.
D. Lower Court Rejection of Civil Arrest
While the United States Supreme Court has not squarely faced the
question of whether arrest for civil violations violates the Fourth
Amendment, lower courts have explored the issue. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently decided Santos v.
Frederick City Board of Commissioners, a case involving a state
55
officer who arrested someone for a civil immigration law violation.
According to the court:
A law enforcement officer may arrest a suspect only if the
officer has “‘probable cause’ to believe that the suspect is
involved in criminal activity.” Because civil immigration
violations do not constitute crimes, suspicion or knowledge
that an individual has committed a civil immigration violation,
by itself, does not give a law enforcement officer probable
cause to believe that the individual is engaged in criminal
56
activity.
In Edgerly v. San Francisco, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reinstated a false-arrest claim based on a San
53. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n.29 (1984) (“[M]ost traffic stops
resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry.”); see
also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653
(1979).
54. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616–17 (2015) (“The question
whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justified detaining Rodriguez beyond
completion of the traffic infraction investigation, therefore, remains open for Eighth Circuit
consideration on remand.”); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007).
55. Santos v. Frederick Cty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2013).
56. Id. at 465 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 433 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)) (internal citation
omitted).
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Francisco police officer taking an individual into custody for an
alleged civil violation.57 Relying largely on state law interpretation of
trespass, seen as an infraction for first-time offenders versus a
misdemeanor, the court overturned a jury verdict against Mr.
58
Edgerly. His matter was remanded for further proceedings, where
he could prevail on his civil rights violation claim.
II. CASE STUDY IN UNCONSTITUTIONALITY: ST. LOUIS COUNTY
& MUNICIPAL POLICING
In light of this background, physical arrest for anything less than
clearly criminal conduct should seem patently out of step with
responsible jurisprudence. Yet the practice of civil arrest is alive,
well, and the accepted norm. Indeed, recent events in the St. Louis
area highlight the unabashed use of civil seizures by municipalities in
Missouri.
St. Louis County, Missouri is home to eighty-eight distinct
59
municipalities; those St. Louis County areas not governed by a
municipality are unincorporated, and are thereby governed by St.
60
Louis County itself—another municipal organization. Both St.
Louis County and its municipalities have their own local
61
ordinances. This Part examines the history of municipal ordinance
prosecution in Missouri and current widespread practices of civil
arrest in the region.
57. Edgerly v. San Francisco, 713 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that arrest for
California civil infraction could provide grounds for false arrest claim).
58. Id.
59. Municipalities, ST. LOUIS COUNTY, http://www.stlouisco.com/YourGovernment/
Municipalities (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).
60. Nancy Curtis, St. Louis Neighborhoods Guide 2015: Unincorporated Living, ST.
LOUIS MAG. (Mar. 20, 2015, 11:32 AM), https://www.stlmag.com/home/st.-louisneighborhoods-guide-2015%3A-unincorporated-living/.
61. St. Louis County, Missouri Ordinance Guidebook, ST. LOUIS COUNTY DEP’T OF
PLANNING (Spring 2011), https://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/Document% 20Library/
planning/subdivision%20trustee%20resource%20center/county%20resources/Ordinance%20Gu
idebook%204.7.11.pdf; Jeremy Kohler, It’s Not Just Pagedale. Lots of Things Are Against the
Law in St. Louis County, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 17, 2016), http://www.stl
today.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/it-s-not-just-pagedale-lots-of-things-are-against/article_
675579d7-d522-5849-8aff-794cb46abb94.html.
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A. History of Municipal Matters in Missouri
1. Local Ordinances as Civil and Not Criminal Provisions
In Kansas City v. Clark, Kansas City fought for the right to pursue
the charge of “keeping a gambling table” under its local ordinance
62
scheme. In considering the issues raised by the City, the Missouri
Supreme Court laid the foundation for what should be the legal
nature of municipal ordinance violations. It explained:
Nor do we regard the violation of the ordinance under
consideration as a crime, since “a crime is an act committed in
violation of a public law;” a law co-extensive with the
boundaries of the State which enacts it. Such a definition is
obviously inapplicable to a mere local law or ordinance, passed
in pursuance of, and in subordination to, the general or public
law, for the promotion and preservation of peace and good
order in a particular locality, and enforced by the collection of
63
a pecuniary penalty.
The Missouri Supreme Court reiterated this holding a few years
64
later in Ex parte Hollwedell. There, the court denied Petitioner’s
65
writ of habeas corpus. In so doing, the court explained in no
uncertain terms that “[t]he infractions of city ordinances are in no
66
sense crimes.” In Hollwedell, St. Louis City brought a case against
petitioner for “a breach of the peace . . . by assaulting, striking and
fighting others, and particularly Louisa Brendley,” which it argued
67
constituted a violation of a city ordinance. Petitioner was convicted
of the violation after a trial and sentenced to pay a fine. He
challenged that conviction, arguing that it was unconstitutional
because St. Louis City did not obtain an indictment nor file a criminal
68
information before rendering judgment against him. Citing Clark,
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Kansas City v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588, 589 (1878).
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395 (1881).
Id. at 395.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 400.
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the Missouri Supreme Court disagreed. “If the violation of the
ordinance for which petitioner was fined is to be regarded as a
criminal offense in the sense of the constitution, there would be much
plausibility in the position taken by counsel. Such offenses, however,
70
have never in this State been regarded as criminal.”
Since Clark and Hollwedell, Missouri courts have consistently
71
applied the rule that municipal ordinance violations are not crimes.
In 2015, for instance, the Missouri Supreme Court reiterated the nowuncontroversial proposition that “[p]rosecutions for municipal
72
ordinance violations are civil proceedings . . . .”
2. Confusion Over the Quasi-Criminal Doctrine
Yet in Missouri, as in some other places, a tension exists between
the civil nature of municipal ordinances and the criminal
consequences they often impose. To reconcile this tension, courts in
Missouri (and elsewhere) have developed what is known as the
“quasi-criminal doctrine.” As a general matter, a “quasi-criminal
proceeding” is “[a] civil proceeding that is conducted in conformity
with the rules of a criminal proceeding because a penalty analogous
73
to a criminal penalty may apply . . . .”
The Missouri Supreme Court first mentioned the phrase “quasi74
criminal” in 1864. The phrase was used in passing, without
explanation, to describe a Missouri statute involving the assignment
75
of mortgage interests. Since that time, Missouri courts have
69. Id. at 401.
70. Id.
71. State ex rel. Kansas City v. Meyers, 513 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Mo. 1974); City of St.
Louis v. St. Louis R. Co., 1 S.W. 305, 307 (Mo. 1886); City of Strafford v. Croxdale, 272
S.W.3d 401, 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting City of Ash Grove v. Christian, 949 S.W.2d 259
(Mo. Ct. App. 1971)); Kansas City v. Plumb, 419 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); City
of De Soto v. Brown, 44 Mo. App. 148, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1891).
72. Tupper v. City of St. Louis, 468 S.W.3d 360, 371 (Mo. 2015).
73. Quasi-Criminal Proceeding, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
74. Ewing v. Shelton, 34 Mo. 518, 518 (1864).
75. Id. Black’s Law Dictionary traces its definition of “quasi-criminal proceedings” to
1844. Quasi-Criminal Proceeding, supra note 73.
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repeatedly referenced the phrase “quasi-criminal” without
76
meaningfully grappling with the concept.
Significantly, Missouri courts have largely avoided addressing
whether municipal ordinances, as civil violations, may impose
77
criminal punishments. Instead, Missouri courts have repeatedly
glossed over the issue by treating municipal violations as criminal for
procedural purposes, thereby sidestepping the thorny constitutional
issues presented by the fact that such violations remain civil in
78
nature. As a result, Missouri municipalities have been free to
impose criminal sanctions on municipal ordinance violators despite
79
their inability to pass and enforce criminal ordinances. This has
created an unfair system that is civil for purposes of informality, but
criminal for allowing arrest and the imposition of punitive sanctions.
B. Current Problem of Civil Seizures: Policing Post-Ferguson
The City of Ferguson is a municipality within St. Louis County,
Missouri. On August 9, 2014, Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson
80
shot and killed Michael Brown. The killing sparked mass protests
across the St. Louis area, and the police responded viciously. One
aspect of the police response to the Ferguson uprising was the routine
arrest of protestors under a number of different Ferguson and St.
81
Louis County ordinances. Both Ferguson and St. Louis County
76. See, e.g., Blewett v. Smith, 74 Mo. 404, 408 (1881); Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395,
400 (1881); Missouri City v. Hutchinson, 71 Mo. 46, 49 (1879); City of Lexington v. Curtin, 69
Mo. 626, 627 (1879); Kansas City v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588, 590 (1878); City of Stanberry v.
Proctor, 48 Mo. App. 56, 56–57 (1892); Piper v. City of Boonville, 32 Mo. App. 138, 139
(1888).
77. See Kansas City v. Bott, 509 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Mo. 1974).
78. Id. (discussing whether double jeopardy applies to municipal-ordinance prosecutions);
Town of Glenwood v. Roberts, 59 Mo. App. 167, 171 (Mo. Ct. App. 1894) (discussing burden
of proof on municipalities to prove someone violated one of its ordinances).
79. St. Louis County Rev. Ord. § 707.020 (making leaving a refrigerator outside in front
of one’s home punishable by sixty days of imprisonment).
80. Ferguson Protests: What We Know of Michael Brown’s Last Minutes, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-28841715.
81. See, e.g., Mariah Stewart & Ryan J. Reilly, Dozens of Protesters Were Charged under
a Bad Law. Now They Could Be Arrested Again, HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2016, 5:00 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ferguson-protesters-st-louis-county-municipal-court_us_
574855bfe4b055bb1171e652.
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82

have ordinances that prohibit “interfering” with police, for instance.
Protestors were arrested under such ordinances for “refusing to obey
a lawful command” or “not complying fast enough,” resulting in
83
confinement periods of twelve hours or longer. It is difficult to
quantify the number of people who police arrested during the
uprising—the police have not publicly released such figures, and it is
questionable whether records of arrests and detentions, as opposed to
municipal-ordinance prosecutions, are even kept.
One example of arrest and prosecution in the wake of the
84
Ferguson uprising involves the case of Melissa Bennett. Ms.
Bennett was arrested on October 22, 2014, outside the Ferguson
Police Department, for violating St. Louis County Ordinance Section
701.110, which makes it “unlawful for any person to interfere in any
manner with a police officer or other employee of the County in the
performance of his official duties or to obstruct him in any manner
85
whatsoever while performing any duty.” The information St. Louis
County filed to institute a prosecution against Ms. Bennett described
her offending conduct as “walking and standing in the roadway after
86
being warned not to do so by the police officer.”
82. ST. LOUIS, MO., MO. CODE ORD. § 701.110 (2016), https://www.municode.com/
library/mo/st._louis_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TITVIIPUSAMO_CH701DEP
O_701.110INOFUN; City of Ferguson Rev. Ord. § 29-17 (2014).
83. See, e.g., Mariah Stewart & Ryan J. Reilly, Dozens of Protesters Were Charged
Under a Bad Law. Now They Could Be Arrested Again, HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2016, 5:00
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ferguson-protesters-st-louis-county-municipal-court_
us_574855bfe4b055bb1171e652; Joel Currier, Federal Judge Bars Police from Forcing
Ferguson Protesters to ‘Keep Moving,’ ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/federal-judge-bars-police-from-forcingferguson-protesters-to-keep/article_4450191b-2430-5da7-ba40-daa55b735f4d.html.
84. Complaint at 1–3, Bennett v. St. Louis Cnty., No. 15SL-CC03628 (filed Oct. 21,
2015).
85. See id.; ST. LOUIS, MO., MO. CODE ORD. § 701.110 (2016), https://www.municode.
com/library/mo/st._louis_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TITVIIPUSAMO_CH701
DEPO_701.110INOFUN.
86. Complaint at 1–3, Bennett v. St. Louis Cnty., No. 15SL-CC03628 (filed Oct. 21,
2015). It is worth pointing out that St. Louis County did not institute its case against Ms.
Bennett via petition or complaint, as is the procedure for civil cases in Missouri. Instead, the
County filed a self-styled “information,” implying that the alleged ordinance violation was a
criminal violation—as criminal cases are instituted in Missouri when a prosecutor files an
information against someone, or when a grand jury returns a true bill.
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We believe that Ms. Bennett’s arrest, as well as other similarly
situated Ferguson protestors, were extra-legal. Putting other
constitutional issues aside, municipal police simply lack the authority
to arrest someone for a mere municipal violation, given its civil
87
nature. Yet they did so on a daily basis during the Ferguson
88
uprising, and they continue to do so today.
Such abuses of power, and the Fourth Amendment, are not limited
to dramatic events that bring international news crews to the streets
of St. Louis County. Indeed, they more often occur during mundane
exchanges between the public and the police in St. Louis County. A
recent case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
89
Eighth Circuit, Copeland v. Locke, provides one such example.
Police Chief Edward Locke of Bella Villa conducted a traffic stop
90
in St. Louis County. In so doing, Chief Locke parked his police
cruiser in a way that blocked access to and from a parking lot; this
prohibited a customer of Norman Steibel’s welding and body shop
91
from exiting the lot, and also blocked customers from entering. Mr.
Steibel approached Chief Locke and asked him to move his police
92
cruiser so the customer could exit. Chief Locke refused, despite Mr.
93
Steibel’s repeated requests. At this point, Mr. Steibel, standing at
some distance from Chief Locke, “pointed down the road, said ‘move
94
the f* * *ing car,’ and pointed at Chief Locke again.” Chief Locke
95
grabbed his handcuffs and approached Mr. Steibel. He then
slammed Steibel against a parked car, threw him to the ground,
kneed him in the back, yanked and twisted the handcuffs on his
wrists, and applied continuing pressure to his neck and back.
As a result of Chief Locke’s force, Mr. Steibel suffered
87. See supra Part I.
88. Dan Keating et al., A Breakdown of the Arrests in Ferguson, WASH. POST (Aug. 21,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/ferguson-arrests/.
89. Copeland v. Locke, 613 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 2010).
90. Id. at 878.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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lacerations to both wrists . . . and abrasions across his body
96
caused by pieces of gravel and debris.
97

Mr. Steibel required emergency room treatment for his injuries.
Chief Locke later asserted that he arrested Mr. Steibel for
violating St. Louis County Ordinance Section 701.110. Mr. Steibel
challenged the arrest in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, asserting that
Chief Locke lacked probable cause to arrest him for violating Section
98
701.110. On summary judgment, the Eighth Circuit agreed.
We doubt, however, whether merely requesting that an officer
move his vehicle, which momentarily distracts the officer from
conducting a routine traffic stop, constitutes interference under
the ordinance. But, even assuming that a Bella Villa police
officer is an officer or employee of St. Louis County, which
we doubt, and that such a distraction does constitute
interference under the ordinance, such expressive conduct
cannot constitute an arrestable offense. That is, “[i]t is . . .
fundamental that a lawful arrest may not ensue where the
99
arrestee is merely exercising his First Amendment rights.”
In other words, if Mr. Steibel violated Section 701.110, the arrest was
nonetheless unlawful because it violated his First Amendment rights.
This is clearly the correct result, but it unfortunately overlooks the
fundamental issue of whether a police officer can arrest someone for
violating a civil ordinance in the first instance. Thus we believe it is
time this issue is taken on squarely, in Missouri and beyond.
III. CONCLUSION: TIME FOR REFORM AS A MATTER OF LAW AND
POLICY
At this important historic moment, it is time for common sense to
prevail. In the United States, people are not arrested for breaching
contracts, committing torts, or engaging in other civil wrongdoings.
We should not tolerate arrests for traffic violations and other low96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 881.
Id. at 880 (quoting Gainor v. Rogers, 973 F.2d 1379, 1387 (8th Cir. 2008)).
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level conduct that does not rise to the level of actual crime.
Therefore, states and localities need to reconsider civil arrest
approaches and replace them with appropriate cite and release
practices. To be sure, other reforms are necessary to address the
many injustices that were brought into greater light following events
in Ferguson, Missouri, including ending jail sentences altogether for
what amount to minor misdeeds. Some of this work may be
100
appropriate for state legislatures.
However, local municipal bodies can shift their priorities from
maintaining jails and incarceral structures to the business of building
communities. The default position for any low-level local offense
should be presentation of a ticket with notice of a future court date.
Local police departments can implement these policies, thereby
allowing resources to be used for truly violent and dangerous
situations. Immediate action, in collaboration with community actors,
provides local governments the opportunity to gain the trust of those
who question the legitimacy of these institutions—which historically
have disproportionately impacted the poor and persons of color. The
alternative is for local governments to continue to cling to the past.
They will find themselves dragged into the twenty-first century and
met by opposition from activists, advocates, and attorneys calling for
an end to the uncivil practice of civil arrest. And all the while, police
will continue to violate the rights of people in America on a daily
basis.
100. See also Not Much New in ‘New’ Supreme Court Rules for Muni Courts, ST. LOUIS
AM. (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/political_eye/not-much-new-in-newsupreme-court-rules-for-muni/article_106f7216-85f3-11e6-b3fb-8389e25f2409.html
(calling
out Missouri Supreme Court’s standards as “insufficient” reforms).
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